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abstract: For different motives, couples in need of third party assisted reproduction sometimes prefer the help of a family member over
an unrelated collaborator. Quantitative (frequency) and qualitative (experience) data about this practice are lacking or scarce. Forms of intra-
familial medically assisted reproduction (IMAR) are different with respect to (i) familial closeness between the collaborator and the person
whose reproductive contribution he or she replaces and whether assistance would be intra- or intergenerational, (ii) the relationship
between the collaborator and the fertile partner (this relationship may or may not be consanguineous) and (iii) with regard to the material
(sperm and oocytes) that is donated and the services (surrogacy) that are offered. This document aims at providing guidance to the professional
handling of requests for IMAR. It briefly sketches the background of this practice and discusses a variety of relevant normative aspects.
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Introduction
Medically assisted reproduction using third parties (‘collaborative’
reproduction) is widely accepted in many countries. While collabora-
tive reproduction mostly involves individuals unknown by the recipi-
ents, some couples prefer the use of a known third party. This
party may be either unrelated (e.g. a friend) or related (a family
member). This latter strategy, termed intrafamilial medically assisted
reproduction (IMAR), raises various ethical issues and is especially
controversial. This paper aims to elucidate these issues and to
provide guidance to the professional handling of requests for IMAR.
Background and facts
There is, maybe surprisingly, a lack of information regarding IMAR.
Data about its frequency, background and practical implications are
scarce. The available evidence, however, strongly suggests that
IMAR is relatively rare, although some types of IMAR may be more
common in some countries and subcultures. One may distinguish
various types of IMAR. A first distinction regards the degrees of familial
closeness, between the collaborator and the person who will be
helped in the IMAR procedure. In terms of the genetic classification,
their relation may be first degree (brother, sister, parent, child),
second degree (aunt, uncle, niece, nephew) or third degree
(cousins). This distinction also applies to surrogacy between women
of different levels of familial closeness. Furthermore, the collaboration
(providing donor gametes, a surrogate uterus or both) may be either
intragenerational (involving members of the same generation) or inter-
generational (involving members of different generations).
A second distinction (not applying to partial surrogacy) regards the
nature of the relationship between the donor and the fertile person,
the one whose gametes will be mixed with those of the donor. This
relationship may or may not be consanguineous. Consanguinity is
defined as reproduction using the gametes of individuals who are
closely related genetically. In the large majority of IMAR cases, there
is no consanguinity involved. In very rare IMAR cases, gametes from
genetically closely related persons may be mixed. Although some
such cases have been reported, none of these involved IMAR
between relatives closer related than third-degree relatives
(cousins). According to the task force (TF), consanguineous cases of
IMAR between first- and second-degree relatives are highly unlikely
to occur in practice. As will be discussed later in this document,
cases of consanguineous IMAR may also be regarded as incestuous,
even though no coitus takes place. Likewise, although partial surrogacy
as such is never consanguineous (see below), the use of a family
member as a partial surrogate (e.g. a sister carrying the child of her
brother and her sister-in-law) may sometimes be regarded as
incestuous.
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In case of consanguinity, there is an increased genetic risk for the
health of the future child. The magnitude of the increased risk
depends on the degree of consanguinity—the closer the genetic
link, the higher the reproductive risk. The general (‘population’) risk
to have a child with a major handicap or disease is 3%. Reproduction
between (first) cousins (third-degree relatives) implies an increased
risk of 2–3%. The risk increases to .10% above the population back-
ground if the parents of these cousins are relatives themselves.
A third distinction regards the genetic material that is donated and
the services that are offered:
– sperm donation: possible donors include brothers, cousins and the
prospective father’s father;
– oocyte donation: for instance, sister-to-sister, daughter-to-mother
or niece-to-aunt oocyte donation. Sister-to-sister oocyte donation
is the most frequent type of oocyte donation in some countries. A
variant of oocyte donation is ovarian tissue donation;
– embryo donation; in these, probably very rare, cases, there are two
donors involved;
– surrogacy: which has two types, namely genetic (or full) and gesta-
tional (or partial). In the former case, the surrogate provides the
oocytes and is artificially inseminated, in the latter she does not
provide the oocytes but carries the IVF embryo(s) of the applicants.
Possible collaborators include a sister, a cousin, the mother and a
daughter of one of the prospective parents.
In practice, some forms of IMAR are more easily accepted by centers
than others. While many clinics accept sister-to-sister oocyte
donation, much fewer clinics accept brother-to-brother sperm
donation. Some fertility clinics spontaneously raise the issue of intrafa-
milial donation when the medical check-up of the patients reveals that
they have to use donor gametes.
General principles
Fertility doctors should take into account the relevant regulations in
their country when they are confronted with a request to assist in
intrafamilial reproduction. Some countries categorically prohibit colla-
borative reproduction or impose the ‘anonymity rule’ in the context of
collaborative reproduction, meaning that any collaborator should be
unknown to the prospective parents. A fortiori, IMAR is illegal in
these countries. Especially relevant are laws against incest (sexual
relations between individuals regarded as too closely related to
marry each other) and consanguinity. Underlying concerns regard
both the increased genetic risks for the offspring and possible social
disruptions and conflicts.
From an ethical point of view, the following principles are of utmost
relevance for the evaluation of IMAR:
Respect for autonomy
Respect for reproductive autonomy includes in principle the choice
with whom to reproduce. People may have different reasons for
asking or accepting the collaboration of a relative in reproduction.
One possible reason is that IMAR allows them to preserve a genetic
link between the infertile partner and any children thus conceived.
Since ‘genetic closeness’ is a generally accepted reason for investing
time and resources into treatment, this reason should carry consider-
able weight in this context. A second possible reason is the
psychological advantage of knowing where the gametes come from.
The recipients need to be able to trust the donor. Thirdly, in some
cases, the easy availability of relatives for collaboration in reproduction
may play a role as well. After all, this can reduce the waiting time. And
finally, in a commercial environment, IMAR may reduce costs as no
payment for the gametes or the uterus should be considered. For
some applicants, IMAR is de facto the only strategy to have children,
as the use of an unknown donor or a known unrelated donor may
sometimes be a mere theoretical alternative.
Respect for the collaborators’ autonomy is important as well. Col-
laborators may have various motives. The dominant motive seems to
be altruism: the wish to help infertile relatives having a child, thereby
contributing to these relatives’ welfare. The creation of additional
progeny by the donors or surrogates is sometimes mentioned as
another motive.
A special question for IMAR is to what extent the consent of the
candidate collaborator’s possible partner should be sought as well.
The helping act (the donation or surrogacy) may considerably affect
this partner’s life. Moreover, in the case of surrogacy, the collabor-
ator’s partner may become the legal parent in some countries.
What if (s)he does not agree? What if (s)he agrees only conditionally,
e.g. on the condition that the future child will not be informed by the
prospective parents about its origins, in order to prevent the child
coming into touch with the donor and his or her family. The situation
becomes even more complex if one acknowledges that similar ques-
tions may arise regarding the role and autonomy of the parents and
possible children of the collaborator. Still, these issues are not specific
for IMAR, as similar questions and possible conflicts may arise in case
of non-familial collaboration.
Objections to IMAR include possible psychosocial pressure on the
donor or surrogate, thereby undermining his or her autonomy, and
possible role confusions with adverse consequences for the persons
involved, including the future child. It may be difficult to balance
these objections with the weight to be given to the applicant’s repro-
ductive autonomy.
Beneficence and non-maleficence
Applicants may greatly benefit from having a baby with the help of a
relative. IMAR may provide advantages over the use of non-family col-
laborators. In some cases, IMAR will be the only realistic option for
people to have a child. Some collaborators may consider it to be an
advantage to have (additional) offspring themselves by means of
IMAR. A possible advantage of IMAR for the child is that the involve-
ment of a relative may facilitate the child’s access to information
regarding its genetic origins or biological roots and its engagement in
contacts with the donor or surrogate mother. Clearly, this presumes
that the child is informed about the way it was conceived.
At the same time, however, IMAR carries possible risks for all
parties involved. Risks may be psychosocial and medical. The psycho-
social risks may regard more than one single party. Focusing, firstly, on
possible risks for the recipients or parents-to-be, the proximity of the
donor or collaborator increases the opportunities for intrafamilial con-
flict. Parents may, for instance, feel threatened in their parental role,
especially in case of role confusion in the relative. If collaborators par-
ticipate in IMAR (partly) because they want to have (additional) chil-
dren themselves, this may carry a substantial risk. In addition, conflicts
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may easily arise if people involved have different views regarding (the
timing of) the provision of information to the child about its origin.
Furthermore, in case of consanguinity the higher genetic risk may
create tensions, more in particular if a handicapped child is born. If
IMAR causes medical harm to the collaborator, this will have negative
repercussions for the recipients as well (guilt feelings, etc.). Finally,
cases of IMAR associated with consanguinity or incest may generate
negative societal reactions even if these labels are not always
correct (some examples of this will be discussed, at the end of
part III).
Risks for the donors or surrogates include psychosocial risks related
(or similar) to the ones just mentioned. In addition, collaborators may
be put under more or less subtle familial pressure to collaborate, even
to the point of coercion. Clearly, this may cause grave conflicts, guilt-
feelings, stress and emotional disturbances with long-lasting adverse
effects. The risk of undue influence is generally considered to be
greater with (first-degree) intergenerational collaboration than with
intragenerational collaboration. As is known from reports and
research regarding surrogacy generally, some surrogates experience
psychological problems, at or immediately after, the moment they
relinquish the child and there have been exceptional cases where
the surrogate wants to keep the child.
Although the medical risks for female collaborators are not specific
for intrafamilial collaboration in reproduction, these risks may be sig-
nificant, both for oocyte donors (risks related to the hormonal stimu-
lation and the oocyte pick-up) and for surrogate mothers (the risks
inherent in pregnancy and delivery). Few data so far suggest that
although many oocyte donors find the procedure painful, stressful
or both, most donors consider it as manageable. The most notable
complaint of oocyte donors is about the time inconvenience and
the geographical distance they have to travel, but not about the
medical or physical aspects of the donation.
Last but not least, risks of IMAR for the (future) child first and fore-
most regard psychosocial risks of growing up in the unconventional
familial environment thus created. Relationships may be confusing
for the child. In case of brother-to-brother sperm donation, for
example, a social uncle will be the genetic father while the rearing
father is actually a genetic uncle. In case of daughter-to-mother
oocyte donation, the daughter will be both mother and sister to the
child and the mother will be both mother and grandmother. The
risk of identity problems of the child may increase in case of role con-
fusion on the part of a collaborator wanting to take up part of the par-
ental responsibilities.
Furthermore, there are increased genetic risks in case of consangui-
nity. Apart from that, intergenerational gamete donation by aged
people may in itself increase these risks, as with an elderly father
who donates sperm to his son. These cases illustrate the complexity
and interrelatedness of the different types of risk involved: while
some experts are concerned that aged men have a relatively high
risk of passing abnormalities to their children, some recipients may
consider a higher age of the sperm donor to be an advantage from
a psychosocial point of view, as the risk of role confusion may be
diminished by the donor’s limited life expectancy.
The balance of possible benefits and harms outlined above does not
seem to rule out the acceptability of IMAR in individual cases and
under further conditions. It is sometimes argued that medical
doctors should not assist in intrafamilial reproduction if there is a
risk of serious harm, even if this risk is (very) low. This view,
however, is too restrictive and at odds with current practice and stan-
dards in medically assisted reproduction. It is the professional’s
responsibility to evaluate each request for IMAR individually. It will
be important, however, to specify the conditions for its acceptance.
Justice
Two considerations are relevant from a justice perspective. First,
according to the principle of formal justice, similar cases should be
treated similarly. If one accepts sister-to-sister oocyte donation, for
example, it would be arbitrary not to accept brother-to-brother
sperm donation—unless there is a clear, morally relevant, difference
between these types of IMAR. Second, intrafamilial collaboration
may facilitate equal access to medically assisted reproduction as it
may avoid the high financial costs involved in oocyte donation and/
or the shortage of gamete donors in some countries. In so-far-as
IMAR circumvents unjust exclusion and enables people to effectuate
their right to reproductive health care, including fertility treatment, it
may be valued in a positive way, at least in principle. At the same
time, it would be problematic if people feel forced to engage in




It is of paramount importance to safeguard informed consent of both
the recipients and the candidate collaborator. Informed consent
requires the provision of adequate information on, and discussion
of, all relevant aspects, more in particular the uncertainties and poss-
ible risks.
Informed consent requires voluntariness as well. It has been argued
that as relatives will be influenced by the infertile couple longing for a
child, their participation in IMAR cannot be voluntary. This critique
regards intergenerational collaboration in particular; this context may
generate especially strong pressures to participate. The view that par-
ticipation cannot be voluntary is, however, problematic, as it presumes
an untenable concept of autonomy. As social creatures, human beings
are always influenced by others. This will often be even more so when
people are confronted with relatives’ health needs and suffering. What
matters, then, is whether candidate collaborators are under undue
influence; i.e. whether they are still able to truly identify themselves
with the decisions they make. The fact that a relative may feel
morally obliged to help, should in itself not be seen as indicating a
less than autonomous choice. The analogy with intra- and intergenera-
tional living organ donation may be helpful here: if one accepts that
relatives may voluntarily donate tissue or (part of) an organ, it
would be inconsistent not to come to the same conclusion with
regard to IMAR.
Still, intergenerational collaboration in reproduction, when com-
pared with intragenerational collaboration, may be especially challen-
ging in view of possible threats to voluntariness. After all, in this
situation and especially so where first-degree relations are concerned,
possible collaborators may be dependent. A distinction should be
made here between parent-to-child donation and child-to-parent
donations. The dependency is mainly a concern for the latter while
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in the parent-to-child donations, a feeling of guilt or responsibility for
the child’s fertility problems and a wish to repair may play a role. At
the same time, one should avoid a simplistic dichotomy between pre-
sumably ‘risk-free’ intragenerational and risky intergenerational collab-
oration. After all, the difference between these scenarios in terms of
possible threats to voluntariness is only gradual. Furthermore, in indi-
vidual cases, intragenerational collaboration (including the widely
accepted practice of sister-to-sister oocyte donation) may involve a
larger danger of undue inducement than intergenerational collabor-
ation (e.g. niece-to-aunt oocyte donation). Although intra-generational
collaboration may be morally preferable in general, a case-by-case
approach regarding both intra- and intergenerational collaboration is
important.
There is a strong, if not universal, consensus that medical pro-
fessionals should never accept a minor relative as gamete donor or
surrogate; minors are considered not to be competent to realize
what it means to have offspring, let alone to engage in IMAR. Although
the age of majority is a necessary condition, it should be supplemented
by the competence or capacity of the (adult) candidate collaborator,
as this is a condition of autonomy. In case of doubt regarding the can-
didate’s competence, professionals should request expert advice or
reject the candidate. Well-considered decision-making may also be
facilitated if the collaborator has at least one child. In the case of
intended surrogacy, the TF considers parenthood to be a precondition
(TF Opinion no.10: Surrogacy).
Counseling
Both combined and separate counseling of recipients and collaborator
is crucially important, as this may facilitate well-considered decision
making and contribute to self-selection, thereby reducing psychosocial
risks. Points to consider in the counseling process include:
– the voluntariness of the collaboration;
– the need for emotional support for all parties involved;
– the roles of the parties and their mutual expectations. It will be
important to acknowledge that collaboration is a gift relationship,
not a strategy for the donor or surrogate to have (additional) chil-
dren or to ensure having a grand child by means of e.g.
father-to-son donation. In this connection, it is very important
also to discuss the scope and limitations of the different roles of
the parties in relation to the actual construction of parenthood;
– the possibility of future tensions between recipients and collabor-
ator and strategies for handling these;
– the possibility of negative societal reactions, especially in cases of
intrafamilial reproduction resembling incest (see below), and strat-
egies for coping with these;
– the implications of IMAR for ’relevant others’ (parents of the col-
laborator, etc.), also as a source of possible (emotional) problems,
and ways to handle these;
– and, last but not least, the issue of whether (and if so, how, when
and in how far) the child should be informed about the method of
its conception and about the identity of the donor?
In the last decades, there has been an international debate about the
moral pros and cons of (not) informing children conceived by gametes
of—mostly unknown—donors about the method of conception and,
in addition, allowing them to acquire knowledge of the identity of the
donor. Do these children have a moral right to be informed? An affir-
mative answer lies at the basis of the regulation of gamete donation in
a growing number of countries, though the normative basis is still con-
tested. A principled, deontological argument in favor of disclosure is
that the child has a right to know its biological origins, more in particu-
lar a right to know the identity of its genetic parents. A consequenti-
alist argument in favor of disclosure of the method of conception is
that there is a (small) risk that the child will find out about the truth
anyway, for example in the context of a marital crisis or, accidentally,
through genetic testing. Accidental disclosure or disclosure in the
context of a crisis may be especially harmful for the child. A relevant
factor in this regard is possible knowledge among other family
members; the more relatives are informed about the method of con-
ception, the higher this risk will become. At the same time, however,
parents may use a consequentialist argument against disclosure,
especially in the context of IMAR, where the child may frequently
meet the relative who was involved, namely that openness may gener-
ate confusion in the child. The TF unanimously endorses the following
view: if other relatives are aware of familial collaboration, counselors
should counsel applicants of IMAR in favor of disclosure and discou-
rage IMAR if applicants are not willing to opt for disclosure. In other
situations, taking into account the different arguments for and
against disclosure, various strategies may be equally justified: while
some would give priority to the child’s right to know, and argue in
favor of motivating applicants to openness, others would be more
concerned about the risk of confusion, and accept a parental prefer-
ence for secrecy.
It is important that the counselor informs the applicants about the
best strategy to tell the future child (the timing, wording, etc.) and that
(s)he offers professional support.
Some applicants may, on further consideration, prefer the use of an
unknown donor. A variant of this strategy is ‘cross donation’, some-
times termed known-anonymous donation. This refers to applicants
recruiting a known donor (this might be a relative) whose gametes
are donated to another (unknown) recipient couple, who in return
provide the gametes for the first couple.
Although the availability of different counselors for each of the
different parties involved might be ideal, this precautionary strategy
seems to be neither necessary, nor realistic in practice. Expert coun-
selors should be able to provide adequate counseling to both parties.
In rare cases, applicants may not want to discuss the relevant risks.
This situation confronts the medical doctor and the counselor with dif-
ficult questions. Some commentators may repudiate the imposition of
unwanted information as unjustified paternalism, at odds with respect
for autonomy. It is important to see, however, that the provision of
adequate information is also a means to risk reduction—which is a rel-
evant consideration in view of the doctor’s responsibility to take into
account the welfare of the child.
Another question is whether the team may take the initiative to
propose IMAR in cases where this might be possible. Merely mention-
ing the possibility would be a matter of presenting all options to the
patient. Whereas this may be acceptable, an exception should
perhaps be made with regard to the first-degree intergenerational
variant of IMAR. Moreover, one should be careful to avoid the
pitfall of presenting the use of a relative as the evident or easiest sol-
ution. In addition, collaboration in such a project should not be pre-
sented as a moral duty among relatives (an example of directive
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counseling). This point relates to the more general question as to
whether—and if so, when—people have a moral obligation to help
others who are in need. Arguments in favor of a duty to engage in
IMAR are that infertility may cause grave suffering and that relatives
may be in a unique position to help. An additional condition for
being morally obliged to help is that the (material and immaterial)
costs for the relative are low. In view of the intricacies of, and possible
emotional problems involved, in IMAR, reasonable people may dis-
agree on the question as to whether relatives have a moral duty to col-
laborate. As a consequence, directive counseling towards asking a
relative is problematic.
It is the responsibility of the candidate collaborator to discuss
intended collaboration with ‘relevant others’, especially the possible
partner, and to solicit their consent/approval. The treating fertility
doctor should check whether this discussion has taken place, and
consent has been obtained, also in view of his or her responsibility
for the welfare of the child. The implication is that the partner
should be invited to participate in (pretreatment) counseling.
Risk reduction
The risks of IMAR, although real, do not seem to be a priori prohibi-
tive. If professionals may decide to engage in IMAR, the following
measures are important to help them minimize risks:
First, offer adequate counseling, as this may contribute to self-
selection of applicants and/or donors, thereby reducing psychosocial
risks. Second, in order to protect collaborators from medical harm,
doctors should stick to safe protocols as used in regular medically
assisted reproduction. Standard protective measures like screening
for infectious diseases should be followed. With regard to age limits,
however, it would be justified to be more permissive. Assuming that
the applicants do not have an acceptable alternative, it is justified to
allow somewhat older oocyte and sperm donors if the recipients
are well-informed about the possible implications and still insist.
Clearly, a flexible policy has its limits, given that the use of oocyte
donors aged 40 years and older may substantially decrease the
success rate of fertility treatments. These may, then, become dispro-
portional or even futile. With regard to relatively older women offer-
ing to be a surrogate for a daughter or a niece, the age-related
increased pregnancy risks justify setting a similar limit as used for IVF
with donor oocytes.
Finally, in cases of IMAR involving consanguinity between third-
degree genetic relatives (the only form of consanguineous IMAR
that the TF regards as realistic), specialized genetic counseling is
appropriate in view of the increased risk of conceiving a child affected
with a serious recessive disease. This is not different from the situation
where consanguineous partners in a cousin-marriage or—relationship
are counseled about their reproductive risk. Taking into account both
the family history and possible increased genetic risks for autosomal
recessive conditions among members of the particular ethnic group
(Caucasians, etc.), the counselor should provide the applicants and
the intended collaborator with adequate information. Part of adequate
genetic counseling and good clinical practice is offering carrier screen-
ing for those disorders that are more prevalent in the particular ethnic
group. For example, Caucasians should be offered carrier screening
for cystic fibrosis, people from particular Mediterranean countries
for hemoglobinopathies and people with a Jewish ancestry for Tay
Sachs disease. If both the applicant whose gametes will be used and
the intended collaborator carry the same disease, there is a known
risk of 25% of conceiving a child affected with the particular condition.
Although preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) might be offered as
a way of avoiding this reproductive risk, this should not be done
without discussing first how the need for an additional invasive tech-
nique might affect the reasons for preferring IMAR over non-related
donation.
The accepted justification of carrier screening is to enable prospec-
tive parents to make informed reproductive decisions. According to
the widely accepted normative framework for counseling and testing
in reproduction, the central ethical principle is respect for reproduc-
tive autonomy. This is made operational by underscoring the impor-
tance of both the prerequisite of voluntariness (as part of informed
consent) and the ideal of non-directive counseling, which implies
that doctors should support prospective parents at high risk, whatever
reproductive option they prefer. This accepted ethical guidance for
genetic counseling and testing is, however, not necessarily helpful in
the context of medically assisted reproduction, in general—and
IMAR involving consanguineous applicants, in particular. Doctors
involved in medically assisted reproduction have the professional
responsibility to take account of the welfare of the possible future
child and to refrain from medically assisted reproduction in case of a
high risk of serious harm to the child (TF Opinion no.13: The
welfare of the child). In view of this, it may be morally justified to
offer genetic testing to applicants at risk of having an affected child
as a condition for access to medically assisted reproduction (a
so-called ‘coercive’ offer). The real issue is not whether it is morally
acceptable to coercively offer carrier screening and, possibly, PGD
to applicants at risk, but when.
In the current context of consanguineous IMAR, two types of
decisions should be distinguished. First, would it be acceptable to
coercively offer carrier screening for one or more disorders prevalent
in the ethnic group? No doubt, in most if not all cases, the risk will be
high enough to justify the offer of carrier screening—but a coercive
offer would be acceptable only in case of high risks. It is debatable
whether this is the case when cousins want to engage in IMAR. If
the parents of the consanguineous applicants are relatives themselves,
the genetic risk of conceiving an affected child may be substantially
higher. As a consequence, a coercive offer of genetic testing for the
particular risk factor(s) would be justified in these cases.
Second, if both the applicant who provides his/her own gametes
and the intended collaborator are found to carry a mutation for the
same disease, a new situation emerges, in view of the high reproduc-
tive risk (25%). No doubt, many applicants would then be willing to
either opt for a non-related donor (abandoning the idea of IMAR)
or make use of PGD. Should a couple insist on IMAR but refuse the
latter option, the professional would be justified, if not morally
obliged, to withhold access to medically assisted reproduction in
view of his or her responsibility to avoid a high risk of serious harm.
Applications which give the appearance of
consanguinity or incest
In most countries, laws and regulations forbidding consanguinity and
incest apply to sex, marriage and reproduction between closer than
third-degree (genetic) relatives. As these laws and regulations were
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written before the era of assisted reproduction and may therefore not
explicitly rule out non-coital forms of reproduction between such rela-
tives, the question might arise whether first- and second-degree con-
sanguineous IMAR are to be regarded as acceptable in those
jurisdictions. The answer to this is that although perhaps not in viola-
tion of the letter of relevant regulations, such forms of IMAR do run
against their spirit. In general, medical professionals should not offer
IMAR when this is at odds with (the spirit of) anti-incest or
anti-consanguinity laws in their country. However, as consanguineous
IMAR is highly unlikely to involve relatives more closely related geneti-
cally than first cousins (third-degree), this seems quite theoretical.
But this is not where the debate ends. Consider the following cases:
(1) an adult daughter donates oocytes to her mother, whose new
partner’s sperm will be used to conceive the child;
(2) a woman intends to engage in full surrogacy to help her brother
and his wife to have a child, meaning that she will carry her broth-
er’s child but without using her own oocytes;
(3) a lesbian woman wants to have a child by receiving (an)
IVF-embryo(s) created with sperm of her brother and oocytes
of her partner.
These cases, although involving reproduction between genetically
unrelated persons, may give the impression of first-degree consangui-
nity and incest, and may therefore be regarded as unacceptable. The
question is whether these concerns are valid. On a closer look, there
really is only a semblance of consanguinity in all cases as no gametes of
genetically related persons are used. This means that from the point of
view of consanguinity prohibitions, these cases are not problematic.
But what about incest? Some may find that all three are still sufficiently
incest-like to be rejected. This seems to lead us back to the appeal to
the ‘spirit’ of the relevant prohibition. But the further this appeal is
stretched to cover situations with different characteristics than those
clearly falling under the prohibition of incest, the less obvious it
becomes that IMAR in those situations would indeed be unjustified.
As there is no sex between close relatives, nor first- or second-degree
consanguinity, what further problem is brought to the fore by calling
these cases incest-like?
In the first case, it is clear what this charge refers to: reproduction
taking place within a parent–child relationship (either biological or
social) is at odds with the very nature and function of such relation-
ships. But in fact, this is not what happens here. The adult daughter
has no parent–child relationship with her mother’s new partner.
Had this been the situation, the first case would indeed have been
morally unacceptable. In its present form, however, it is difficult to
see why the arrangement described in this case would be more pro-
blematic than other instances of intergenerational IMAR. With regard
to the other two cases, even if there is no coitus and no mixing of
gametes, what makes them incest-like is presumably that gametes
and reproductive functions of closely related relatives (the sperm of
a brother and the uterus of a sister) are brought together with the
aim of producing a child. Here again, the question is why this would
be morally problematic.
For all three cases, the answer to this question cannot be that these
instances of IMAR simply ‘don’t feel good’, as that would be the
expression of a gut feeling rather than a moral argument. A conceiva-
ble argument is that even if these cases are not problematic in them-
selves, they may provoke negative reactions from other relatives and
society, which may have adverse consequences for the welfare of
the child. But this either too easily presumes that these cases
involve a high risk of serious harm or wrongly presumes a more
rigid, problematic standard, according to which professionals should
not assist in reproduction if there is even a small risk for the child.
The argument is also at odds with the wide acceptance of, for
example, assisted reproduction in lesbian couples. After all, children
raised by these couples may likewise suffer from negative societal reac-
tions—but this argument has not stood in the way of growing support
for helping these couples to have children.
To conclude: first- or second-degree consanguineous IMAR would
be at odds with the spirit of laws and regulations forbidding consangui-
nity and incest and should therefore be rejected. However, such cases
are highly unlikely to be proposed in practice. IMAR involving the mere
semblance of first- or second-degree consanguinity may still raise con-
cerns about incest. However, without further arguments establishing
that these concerns refer to serious moral objections, providing assist-
ance to such arrangements may well be justified.
Recommendations
– IMAR is a morally acceptable practice in some situations and on
some conditions.
– Both combined and separate counseling of recipients and collabor-
ators are crucial as this may contribute to both well-considered
decision making and risk reduction.
– IMAR should be withheld in case of undue pressures on the collab-
orators or a high risk of serious harm for the possible child.
– There are no a priori moral objections to intergenerational IMAR.
First-degree intergenerational collaborations need special scrutiny
in view of the increased risk of undermining autonomous choice.
– Cases of IMAR involving third-degree consanguinity, though accep-
table in principle, call for additional counseling and risk-reduction.
– Although there should be no room for first- or second-degree con-
sanguineous IMAR, cases involving only a semblance of such
arrangements may also be acceptable.
– More research into the psychosocial implications of IMAR is of
paramount importance. The findings of such research may well
contribute to more adequate moral guidance.
– Practitioners who refuse to collaborate in demands for IMAR
should refer the patients to another centre for consideration.
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